

**THE STUDY OF INDONESIAN MOSLEM RESPONSES ON
SALAFY- SHIA TRANSNATIONAL ISLAMIC EDUCATION INSTITUTION**

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Abstrak

Artikel ini menggambarkan respon muslim Indonesia terhadap institusi pendidikan Islam transnasional Salafi dan Shia di Indonesia. Kehadiran institusi ini tidak bisa dipisahkan dari peran Saudi Arabia dan Iran dalam pendiriannya. Tujuan utama dari Pendidikan Salafi adalah untuk memurnikan praktek ajaran Islam yang dijalankan Muslim Indonesia. Sementara itu, tujuan utama dari Pendidikan Shia adalah untuk memperkenalkan Pemikiran Islam Shia, terutama setelah Revolusi Iran pada tahun 1979. Ada dua respon Muslim Indonesia terhadap Pendidikan Islam transnasional ini. Respon yang pertama adalah penolakan yang diwakili oleh kelompok puritan dan tradisional. Kelompok puritan ini adalah DDII, Persis, Al-Irsyad, dan FUUI; sementara itu, kelompok tradisional, diwarisi khususnya oleh beberapa figur Nahdlatul Ulama sebagai upaya untuk mempertahankan tradisi keagamaan lokal dan budaya. Respon yang kedua adalah penerimaan, yang ditunjukkan oleh muslim-muslim moderat di Indonesia; kelompok ini terdiri dari Muhammadiyah dan Nahdlatul Ulama, yang diharapkan dapat mempromosikan pemahaman toleransi Shia.

Kata Kunci: *Pendidikan Islam Transnasional; Salafi; Shia; Tradisi keagamaan*

Abstract

This article describes the Indonesian Moslem responses to the institution of transnational Islamic education of Salafi and Shia in Indonesia. This can not be separated from the role of Saudi Arabia and Iran in the establishment of these educational institutions. The main objective of the Salafi's education is to purify the form of Islam practiced by Indonesia Moslems. Meanwhile the main objective of the Shia's education is to introduce the Shia Islamic thought, notably after the revolution of Iran in 1979. There are two responses on transnational Islamic Education from Indonesian Moslems. The first is rejection that represents the puritanist and traditionalist group. The puritanist group are DDII, Persis, Al-Irsyad, and FUUI. Shia Meanwhile, the traditionalist group especially inherited by some figures of Nahdlatul Ulama as a form of maintaining the local religious tradition and culture. The second is acceptance that is shown by the moderate Moslems in Indonesia. This group includes Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama that need to promote understanding of tolerance Shia.

Keywords: *Transnational Islamic Education; Salafi; Shia; Religious tradition.*

مستخلص

توضح هذه المقالة استجابة من المسلمين الاندونيسيين ضد مؤسسة السلفية الإسلامية والشيعية في إندونيسيا. ووجود هذه الحركة لا يمكن فصلها عن دور المملكة العربية السعودية وإيران في تأسيسها. والغرض الرئيسي من التعليم لهذه الحركة هو تنقية ممارسة التعاليم الإسلامية الجارية لدى مسلم إندونيسيا. كما أن الغرض الرئيسي من التعليم الشيعي هو تقديم الفكر الشيعي خاصة بعد الثورة الإيرانية في عام 1979. هناك نوعان من استجابة المسلمين الاندونيسية لهذه التربية الإسلامية عبر الطوائف الوطنية. الأولى هي إنكار يمثل المتشددون والتقليدية. المتشددون هم مجلس الدعوة الإسلامية الإندونيسية والوحدة الإسلامية وجماعة الإرشاد ومنتدى المجتمع العلماء الاندونيسي ، وفي حين فإن هؤلاء التقليديون روادهم طائفة تهمزة العلماء هم الحفاظ على تقاليد الممارسة الدينية والثقافية المحلية. وثانيها هي القبول، وهو ما أشار إليه من قبل المسلمين المعتدلون في إندونيسيا. تتكون هذه المجموعة من المحمدية ونهضة العلماء، ويتوقعون من الشيعة التسامح.

الكلمات الرئيسية: التربية الإسلامية عبر الطوائف الوطنية، السلفيين، الشيعة، التقاليد الدينية

A. Introduction

The development of *Salafi's* and *Shia's* doctrine through educational institutions have increased significantly after the outbreak of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. This has provided the momentum of rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran in gaining political influence in the Islamic world. The success of Ayatollah Khomeini in establishing the Islamist government has attracted sympathy in the Islamic world and it seemed he has sent a very clear message to the existence of Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia used education as a strategy to reinforce its image as a center of the Islamic world by providing a number of scholarships, the construction of educational and religious facilities, and various other social aids in the spread of *Salafi* movement in various countries.

Indonesian Moslems are the main target of Saudi Arabia considering their strategic roles in helping the spread of the Salafi doctrine and the anti-*Shia* sentiments. Thus, in the 1980s Saudi Arabia provides scholarships for Indonesian

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Moslem activists to study in Saudi Arabia. In addition, Saudi Arabia has also contributed to the establishment of various *Salafi* educational institutions in Indonesia. Starting with the cooperation between DDII and the Saudi government, the development of *Salafi* among Indonesian Moslems activists successfully set up various educational institutions. The activists built good relationships with scholars in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Kuwait in developing Salafi doctrine to Indonesia. Some leaders like Abu Nida, Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin, and Ainur Rafiq Ghufuron are cadres of DDII¹ who successfully develop understanding of Salafi in Indonesia.²

The development of educational institutions of Salafi in Indonesia currently experience a significant increase. From the education level garden-childhood (kindergarten), primary education up to the college level, both as formal and non-formal schools. Some of the current educational institutions of *Salafi* include *Pesantren Al-Furqan* in Gresik (East Java), *Al-Atsari* in Ciamis and *As-Sunnah* in Cirebon (West Java).³ Then, higher education institutions were highly prioritized by Saudi Arabia as the forerunner in the development of various educational institutions of *Salafi*. At this point, these schools, like LIPIA has received permission from the Indonesian government to open a branch in Makassar, Medan, and Surabaya is LIPIA⁴

The main objective of the education agency of *Salafi* is to spread the form of practice oriented regarding *Wahhabi-Salafi* understanding which is to purify the form of Islam practiced by Moslem in Indonesia. The teaching focuses on the spread of the strict doctrine of the purification of the faith and keep the tradition of *salaf al-salih*, and refuse to adjust to the local culture and tradition in Indonesia. According to Marty, this character was often shown through attitudes of oppositionism, a very stiff stance in understanding the holy Quran, rejecting pluralism and relativism.⁵ Their

¹ DDII is the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council, an organization that established by Muhammad Natsir (1903-1993) and the former founder of Masyumi in 1967.

²Noorhaidi Hasan, *Islam Politik di Dunia Kontemporer: Konsep, Genealogi, dan Teori* (Yogyakarta: Suka Press, 2012), 54.

³Din Wahid, *Nurturing Salafi Manhaj: A Study of Salafi Pesantrens in Contemporary Indonesia*, (Indramayu: t.p, 2014), 152.

⁴ <http://khazanah.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/16/09/04/ocynh7301-lipia-buka-tiga-cabang-baru-di-indonesia>

⁵Martin E. Marty, *Fundamentalism as a Ecumenical Challenge* Edited by Hans Kung & Jurgen Moltmann (London, 1992), 3.

educational institutions are seeking to develop of the *Salafi* doctrine with three main sources, namely, the Quran, Hadith and follow the example of the *Salafi manhaj*.

Likewise, *Shia* educational institutions also experienced a significant improvement in Indonesia. *Shia* educational institutions in Indonesia also grow from kindergarten level, basic education and higher education. Some of the institutions which are famous as the basis for distributing the *Shia* principles are *Pesantren* YAPI in Bangil (East Java), Al Hadi in Pekalongan, Dar al-Taqrib in Jepara (Central Java), Al-Mukarramah and Mutahhari, in Bandung (West Java), Nurul Tsaqalayn in Leihitu (Central Maluku)⁶ and STFI, (the College of Islamic Philosophy of Sadra) in Jakarta. In the process of education, *Shia* institutions *Shia* are not rejecting the existence to local culture and tradition.

The general objective is to *Shia* introduce a *Shia* Islamic thoughts in theology, jurisprudence, philosophy, or *tasawwuf* to the Indonesian people. Unlike the *Salafist*, *Shia* educational institutions have already taught the subjects of philosophy, subjects that are considered taboo by most educational institutions of *pesantren* in Indonesia. Thoughts of Iranian intellectuals in the field of Islamic philosophy and *tasawwuf* *Irfani Shia* were inspired Ali Shariati, Mutahhari, Tabathaba'i and Mulla Sadra.⁷ These leaders have a special place for graduate *Hawzah Ilmiah* Qum to then be transformed into educational institutions with the typical model of *Shia* thought. *Shia* Islamic thoughts were included in the study as a strategy to gain recognition from the majority of Indonesian Moslems.⁸

Based on the above explanation, that the existence of the *Salafi* and *Shia* Islam transnational institutions in general can not be separated from the similarity of Islamic thought brought by intellectual networks originating from Saudi Arabia and Iran. *Shia* It is inseparable from the notion that the presence of both the Islamic institutions on the influence of Saudi Arabia and Iran, two countries that become a reference for *Salafi* and *Shia* educational institutions in Indonesia. Some worry about the presence of both institutions *Salafi* and *Shia* will bring transnational ideology because of their affiliation to the State Saudi Arabia and Iran. Therefore, These ideologies may replace the role of the mainstream Indonesian Moslems ideology. This is voiced by propagation commission's chairman of MUI that "Wahhabi *Salafi*

⁶Zulkifli, *The Struggle of The Shi'is in Indonesia* (Leiden: Universitas Leiden, 1966), 159.

⁷Syamsuri Ali, *Alumni Hawzah Ilmiah Qum: Pewacanaan Intelektual dan Relasi Sosialnya dalam Transmisi Syiah di Indonesia* (Jakarta: UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 2005), 18.

⁸Zulkifli, *The Struggle of The Shi'is*, 307.

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and *Shia* influence will shift the position of civil society organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah in 2030".⁹

B. Discussion

1. Behind the rejection: the case of Salafy

The existence of *Salafi* and *Shia* also often elicits mixed responses from Moslems groups in Indonesia. Most of Indonesian Moslems groups are grouped into rejectionist, because the presence of *Salafi* and *Shia* thought often led to disagreement among Moslems.

The rejection is caused by rigid stance and does not want to accept the culture and local traditions shown by *Salafi*.¹⁰ They do spread the Islamic understanding through education. Although some other Moslems groups is supporting the existence of a *Salafi* in certain aspects because of their common understanding of the doctrine.. and that the development of *Salafi* in Indonesia has inspired the emergence of a number of organizations reformers of modern Islam in Indonesia. Organizations such as Muhammadiyah, Al-Irsyad, shared similar intentions topurify faith with the call back to the Quran and *Sunnah*, and leave many traditional customs that are claimed to be contaminated by heresy, *tahayyul*, and superstition.¹¹

In contrast to Persis and Al-Irsyad, Muhammadiyah in the course of the development of Islamic thought exhibited by some central figures is relatively more moderate. For Muhammadiyah, the purification of faith and the return to the Quran and *Sunnah* is an obligation. However, it should not be rigidly understood with. In understanding the doctrine of purification the Muhammadiyah should not be understood literally and should not show resistance to local cultures and traditions. The Islamic understanding must be understood in the correct interpretation and methodologically valid way of thinking .¹²

⁹<https://serambimata.com/2015/01/22/kata-mui-pusat-tahun-2030-wahabi-dan-syiah-targetkan-habisi-nu/>

¹⁰ Muhammadiyah doctrine theology agrees with *salafi*, namely puritanist by going back to Al-Quran and As-Sunnah as the source of the main legal (*arruju 'ila al-Quran wa Assunnah*), but in a different idea with *Salafi* because Muhammadiyah is not rigid in understanding religious texts

¹¹Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad, Islam, Militansi, dan Pencarian Identitas di Indonesia Pasca-Orde Baru*, Translated by Hairus Salim (Jakarta: Pustaka LP3ES, 2008), 36.

¹² Interview with Ahmad Rofiq, Secretary of the Legal Affairs Committee of the Board of Muhammadiyah.

2. The rejection in the case of *Shia*

In contrast to the presence of the *Salafi*, some Indonesian Moslems considered *Shia* as a deviant sect because it is different from the ideology of the majority Indonesian Sunni moslem. As a result of these fears, some Moslems groups often attempt to attack the *Shia* presence. To some degree, the rejection and sentiment towards *Shia* is seemingly 'supported' by the authorities of the Islamic organizations in Indonesia who are members of the MUI. Some rejection responses are seen on the attacks of Al-Hadi branch schools in Batang (Central Java) in 2000, rejection by the Indonesian Moslems Ulama Forum (FUUI) in Bandung in 2012, the burning of houses of *Shia followers* in Sampang Madura in 2012, attacks on the *Shia* in Bogor, which is chaired by the Mayor of Bogor in October 2015.

Various evidence also show that the problem of Islamic education in Indonesia have not been able to overcome the gaps in society. Islamic education in Indonesia does not have an established identity. The value system of Islam taught in Islamic education is still highly influenced by the thought of schools and doctrines of Islamic theology.¹³ Thus, in practice, various educational institutions are always evolving Islamic identity on Islamic organization and ideology. Islamic education is supposed to form awareness of the values of *ilahiah*, to shape critical thinking and accept differences and interpretations of the various Muslim groups and highlight the mutual understanding of each identity. In the modern society, the issues of sectarianism which lead to intolerance towards religious disagreement must be avoided. But the fact that most people are still trapped within religious sectarianism may lead to compulsive resistant attitude.

3. Genealogy, Development and Education Thought Typology *Salafi* and *Shia* in Indonesia

In discussing the *Salafi* movement in Indonesia, there is a necessity to distinguish between the *Salafi* and the *Wahhabi*, despite the tendency to equate the term. In general, the difference between the *Salafis* and *Wahhabi* revolves around the terminology. The word "*Salafi*" preferred to avoid the negative stigma of the mainstream of Indonesian Moslems. of the term *wahhabi*. *Salafi* is a language derived from the word "*salafa*", meaning "first" (to precede), and the word "*Salaf*"

¹³Muhaimin, *Pemikiran dan Aktualisasi Pengembangan Pendidikan Islam* (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2011), 12.

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meaning "predecessor". Thus "*Salafi*" means a group of followers of the *Salaf* generation.¹⁴ While the term "*Wahhabi*" often attributed to Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, as the originator of *Wahhabism*. However, in the meaning of "*Salafi*" and "*wahhabi*" is no different, that of the understanding of Islam (doctrine), which returns the *Salafi manhaj* in religious practices of Islam.

The tendency of the word "*Salafi*" was chosen to indicate a neutral meaning and the impression of the resistance of the word "Wahhabi". In addition, to avoid the impression of a "cult" to Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. This is as followers of *Salafi* who refused to say as a group "Wahhabi" and prefer called "*Salafi*".¹⁵ Thus, the *Salafists* in this paper is a movement that emerged from the spirit of the struggle of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab in evoking Islam (Islamic doctrine) to return to the methodology of *Salafi (Salaf al-Salih)*, by returning to the source of the Qur'an, al-hadith, and follow the procedures for the religious practices of generasai salaf al-salih (*Salafi manhaj*). A *Salafi* is the individual who follows the methodology of the Salaf, who has consistently adhered to the legal sources of Quran and Hadith. They always rely on the first generation of the third generation, that friend, tabi'in and tabi'it successors in the understanding of Islamic doctrine. For three generations this is considered to be the closest to the generation of the prophet Muhammad¹⁶.

Embryo emergence of *Salafi* in the contemporary era, which then rooted in *Salafi* as a transnational movement was in the decade of the 1960s. The emergence of *Salafi* in this era cannot be separated from the group *al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Salafiyah* as a religious conservative movement on the fringes of the Arab. Thanks to King Faisal oriented "pan-Islamism" and the dynamics of the Cold War, in 1964, *al-Jama'ah al-Salafi* group mated with mainstream Arab awakening famous with *al-Sahwah al-Islamiyah*. The group *al-Sahwah al-Islamiyah*, as the Arab awakening movement can not be separated from it's relationship with groups such as the

¹⁴Abu al-Fadl Muhammad Ibnu Mansur, *Lisan al-Arab* (Beirut: Dar Shadir, 1410 H.), 2068.

¹⁵Noorhaidi Hasan, "The *Salafi* Movement in Indonesia: Transnational Dynamics and Local Development," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and The Middle East* 27, No. 1 (2007): 8.

¹⁶However, the genealogy of Salafi can not be devoted to Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, it has a background of historical thought is interconnected between the predecessor generation and the generation after that, even though the idea spawned a variety of discourse, depending on the context that underlie the development of the movement. According to Abu Zahra, was quoted as saying Jalaluddin Rahmat, Salafi synonymous with thinking followership Imam Malik ibn Hanbal in faith in the fourth century Hijriah. This thought is raised again in the seventh century hijriah, by Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah. In the twelfth century hijriah developed by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. And in the modern age, the Salafi thought developed by Jamaluddin Al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Ridha. Jalaluddin Rachmat, "Roots of Conflict Sunni-ShiaShia ideology", *Journal of Maarif*, 77-78.

Brotherhood Moslems, and *Jamaate Islami*. They managed to thrive in universities such as the University of Saudi Arabia and Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University of Madinah as a form of government strategy Arabia in helping Moslemsin Brotherhood group when it was hounded by government to Egypt after the execution of Sayyid Qutb in 1966.¹⁷

It seems that the strategy succeeded in intensifying the relationship between *al-Sahwah al-Islamiya* and *al-Jama'ah al-Salafi*. But the relationship between the them did not last long because in the mid-1970s, the relationship turned into enemies. The dispute was caused by the differences in their strategies. *Al-Jama'ah al-Salafi* using non-political strategy and choosing the path of struggle through downward path by staying firm working on an implementation of sharia in individuals in the community. This strategy is more important than strategy to seize power lines from above through a coup. For *al-Jama'ah al-Salafi* group *al-Sahwah al-Islamiyah* fight political and revolutionary has failed and resulted in the breaking up of Moslems and provoke bloodshed.

Thus, I can say that the development of the *Salafi* experience a variety of twists and turns that very complex resulting from political setting, Saudi Arabia is playing in a dual strategy, the spread of religious and political. Sentiment religious ideology and politics play an important role in the spread of *Salafi* circumnavigating the globe, where the movement is experiencing some type of movement caused by the differences in the pattern and fighting strategies as described above. Based on this understanding of the *Salafi* movement as part of a transnational Islamic movement have certain types as its relationship to fighting strategy undertaken by Saudi Arabia. Quintan Wiktorowicz, dividing the *Salafi* movement to the purist, politico, and jihadi,¹⁸ Zoltan Pall divide the purist and haraki,¹⁹. Din Wahid split on the type of purist, haraki and jihadists.²⁰ But the *Salafi* presence in Indonesia, according to Din Wahid is puritanist driven more by the spirit of the movement than haraki and jihadi.

¹⁷Noorhaidi Hasan, *Islam Politik di Dunia Kontemporer: Konsep, Genealogi, dan Teori* (Yogyakarta: Suka Press, 2012), 49.

¹⁸Wiktorowicz, Quintan. *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001).

¹⁹Zoltan Pall, *Lebanese Salafis Between the Gulf and Europe* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012).

²⁰Din Wahid, *Nurturing Salafi Manhaj*, 10.

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Referring to the Din opinion, I say that the *Salafi* movement in Indonesia at this time is more inclined to attempt the purification of Islam and attempts to restore the teachings of the Quran and Sunnah to follow the example of *al-Salaf al-salih*. The trend in putting puritanist on *Salafi* Indonesia, leading to the discourse on Islam followership survivors of heresy, and return to the Quran and Sunnah raised rigidly. In a position of understanding *Salafi manhaj* rigid, not willing to dialogue with local cultures and traditions cause *Salafi* often trigger confrontations with some groups of Indonesian Moslems who will possibly give birth to the movement or even may bring any violence. Did not rule out the dark history of the early development of the *Salafi* in Indonesia by a trio of Haj, Haji Miskin, Haji Abdurrahman, and Haji Muhammad Arif, the beginning of the 19th century as the *Salafi* movement in Indonesia inspired the spirit of puritanism rigid will reappear, trio Haji regarded as polytheism (*tasyrik*), infidel (*takfir*), and convert (*tardid*) against a group of other Moslems who disagree with them.²¹

Meanwhile *Shia* growing at the moment, be interpreted as a concept of *Syiatu Ali*, the general meaning is defined as understanding *Shia* followers of Ali bin Abi Thalib row.²² The *Syiatu Ali* are the ones who follow the line of spiritual and political leadership of Imam Ali, cousin and son in law of the Prophet Muhammad. Making the concept of the *Syiatu Ali*, in an effort to seat position *Shia* concept used in this paper, thus implies more inclusive than the *tasyayyu* concept, which is defined only as ideology and understand the *Shia*. Thus the word *Shia*, contains two terms, namely *Shia diniyah* (spiritual) and *Shia siyasah* (politics). Which could be interpreted to contain a separate meaning. In that sense one can become a spiritual *Shia* political though not pledged (*bai'at*). And conversely, one can adhere to *Shia* political opinion, without following the spiritual leadership of Imam Ali.²³ Thus is *Shia* here is not to be pledged directly to the imam Ali, but *Shia* interpreted as past generations that follow the line of the intellectual, spiritual, and political ideology imam Ali and his descendants.

Generally *Shia* Indonesia following the familiar idea of Iran, often known as the *Shia Ithna 'asyara*, or of *Imamat*. *Shia* development in Indonesia can not be

²¹Abdurrahman Wahid, *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia*, Edited by Abdurrahman Wahid (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2009), 94.

²²Dicky Sofjan (ed), *Sejarah dan Budaya Syiah di Asia Tenggara* (Yogyakarta: SPs UGM, 2013), viii.

²³Ibid.

separated from the role of Indonesian scholars who had studied at the University, especially in *Hawzah Ilmiah Qum*. Especially after the Iranian revolution in 1979. Communities in this phase are groups of intellectuals educated and intellectual. They are more interested in thoughts *Shia* like Ali Shariati, Mutahhari, Thabathaba'i, and Mulla Sadra.²⁴ As the influence of *Salafi* understand influenced by the alumni of the Middle East, especially the alumni of the University of Saudi Arabia, Iran alumni also hold the pattern of spread of the *Shia* through educational institutions. According to Fazlur Rahman, that the education pattern *Shia* in Indonesia, from the influence of the scholars of Qum has a characteristic that emphasizes creative philosophical tradition as reflected in the curriculum, which managed to inculcate the spirit of critical intellectual tradition. And a critical spirit and intellectual tradition is practically unknown in educational institutions Sunni.²⁵

Referring to Rahman's information above that the existence of institutions *Shia* in Indonesia can not be separated from the influence of graduate alumni of Qum which patterns follow the pattern of teaching their education in Iran. The general pattern of the *Shia* education in Indonesia led to the formation of mental dualism, reformers and radicals. The formation of a mental dualism that education of *Shia* in Indonesia is predominantly oriented jurisprudence, but their intellectual philosophical traditions influenced small effect on its legal reasoning. Formation of the reformers, that the educational process-oriented by *Shia* ethics, theology, and philosophy in total and in order to carry out *ijtihad* or a true original thinking on the problems that demand new solutions. And the formation of a radical stance is based on the opinion the education process and the principles of Islamic-oriented active measures and called the message needs to be an awareness of social morality to society.²⁶

4. Indonesian Moslems respond to the *Salafi's* and *Shia's* Institutions

So far the response of the majority Moslems Indonesia on the existence of *Salafi* and *Shia* institutions in general remains under control. But at a certain moment, the escalation toward open conflict is not impossible to continue to happen, especially if the elites Moslems and some Islamic organizations do not take part in

²⁴Syamsuri Ali, *Alumni Hawzah Ilmiah Qum*, 18.

²⁵Fazlur Rahman, *Islam dan Modernitas: Tentang Transformasi Sosial* (Bandung: Pustaka, 1985), 126.

²⁶Syamsuri Ali, *Alumni Hawzah Ilmiah Qum*, 6.

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bridging the conflict. What more when it comes to sentiment towards the understanding of beliefs or ideologies. Under conditions of a difference that can not be bridged with the dialogue process would lead to a conflict that lead to conflict. These conditions will increasingly lead to a clash triggered by a narrow understanding in the field of religious practice. Practices such a narrow understanding of this, as was said Amin Abdullah as practice their faith and understanding of religion passed without the theoretical clarification and purification so that the difference between religion and tradition, religion and culture, between belief and habit of mind is difficult to separate.²⁷

In bridging the religious tensions or belief in order to not get stuck on a narrow understanding further described by Amin Abdullah the need for a critical understanding that is often referred to as *meta discourse* understanding. Furthermore, the divisions between the Islamic group one with another Islamic group, said Abdokarim Soroush more affected by the problem of Islamic theology or kalam and fiqh are often synonymous with Sunni groups, and *'irfani* groups who identified with *Shia*. If the segregation is not matched by the dialogue, then that will happen is a clash and conflict. Therefore Soroush offer dialogue model epistemology, interpenetration and evolution . The epistemology of kalam and fiqh discussed with the epistemology of *'irfani*, or how to articulate all three social sciences, natural and humane so that from this interpretation embodied in evolution. In terms of theory of contraction and expansion (*qabz- va-basth*) is the interpretation of religious texts in the understanding of religion and religious ideas which run dynamic and always changing.²⁸ Thus the critical approach of Amin Abdullah and theory of contraction and expansion revealed by Abdolkarim Soroush in the context of the *Salafi* and *Shia* in Indonesia is often played on the issue of Sunni and *Shia*, although in many cases there are differences in the meaning of the concept of a Sunni from among Moslems in Indonesia can be used in explaining how the majority of Indonesian Moslems respond to the presence of *Salafi* and *Shia* institutions.

In general, Islam in Indonesia is often characterized by a strong resistance from individuals, Islamic organizations, or other institutions of the *Salafi* and *Shia*. The response shown by several community organizations which are sometimes

²⁷Abdullah, M. Amin. *Islamic Studies di Perguruan Tinggi Pendekatan Integratif-Interkonektif* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2010), 72.

²⁸Abdolkarim Soroush, *Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 36.

raised in response to *Salafi* and *Shia* are also different. As ideas that are considered transnational, *Salafi* and *Shia* can not be separated from the challenges of further spread in Indonesia respectively. Although doctrinally understood *Salafi* ideology has similarities with the Sunni majority in Indonesia, but the rigid attitude shown by *Salafi* groups sometimes led to conflict with the majority of Indonesian Moslems. Likewise with the *Shia*, theological doctrinal differences into major cause of the rejection of most Indonesian Moslems.

5. The Rejecting Response

The existence of favoring *Salafi* Sunni majority has its own place among Indonesian Moslems. Unlike the *Shia* theological doctrines which are a minority. Proximity *Salafi* with the majority of Indonesian Moslems in the doctrine has been demonstrated by the role of Indonesian Moslems figures. In the doctrine of Al-Irsyad, Persis and Muhammadiyah as the reformists have a closeness with *Salafi*. Then through Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia which in the 1980s to establish a good communication with Saudi Arabia. Through DDII which at the time led by M. Natsir, as the embodiment of Masyumi which is a forum of major Islamic organizations, including NU, making *Salafi* almost parallel to the position of the majority group of Indonesian Moslems. Therefore, in response to the presence of transnational Islamic organization, the resistance is more directed at the *Shia* presence than to the *Salafi*. Moreover, MUI as the official sanctioning body for the presence of Muslim organizations in Indonesia to keep a distance with the *Shia* for their differences away with the *Shia* in the understanding of Islam, especially in matters of temporary marriages (*nikah Mut'ah*) and their recognise that the *Shia* not Sunni groups.

MUI issuance of the *fatwa* cannot be dissociated with the development of shiism in Indonesia. *First* MUI states that the *fatwa* is a response to what it considers a growth in practice of *mut'ah* among Moslems in Indonesia, and in particular youths and students. *Second*, according to MUI, there has been anxiety and unrest among parents, ulama, leaders, educators, and the wider Moslems community, that the practice of *muta* is being used as means of *Shia* propagation in Indonesia. *Third*, MUI affirm that the majority of Moslems in

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Indonesia are Sunni who reject *Shia* in general and its teaching of *muta'ah* in particular.²⁹

In general, in the extreme rejection of the *Shia* Islamic group came from the puritanist Indonesia, like Persis, DDII, Al-Irsyad and FUUI. Those organizations that deny the existence of *Shia* Islam because of the doctrine taught *Shia* drifting away from the teachings of Islam. As evidence is *Salafi* developments in the New Order was greeted enthusiastically by DDII embodies Masyumi. Through the spread of *Salafi* DDII in Indonesia is growing rapidly with the help of the massive Saudi Arabia in financing the Indonesian students studying in the Middle East in the decade of the 1970s. Several alumni of the Middle East will be the main agents in the spread of *Salafism* in Indonesia,³⁰ is not said to be the only Islamic organization which paved the way for the development of understanding, *Salafi* in Indonesia. Din Wahid said that organizations such as Muhammadiyah, Persis, al-Irsyad has an important role in the development³¹ *Salafi* in Indonesia.³²

Indirectly the presence of *Shia* in Indonesia in general are a minority among the majority Moslems Indonesia. Various responses to violence in resisting the *Shia* as happened various areas, for example in 2000 there was an attack on the buildings and facilities in the Shiite branch of Pesantren Al-Hadi in Batang were burned and destroyed.³³ In 2011, there was an attack or riot in the complex of Pesantren YAPI with Sunnis.³⁴ Beginning in January 2012 conflict occurred in the boarding school in Sampang Madura Tajul grandiose. Still in 2012 clashes in muddy caused friction issues Shiite proselytizing. The most extreme is *Shia* Sampang Madura expulsion from their homeland. The conflict became a national issue and can not be resolved until now. In addition, attacks on Shiite group also occurred in Bogor, led by the Mayor of Bogor in October 2015³⁵, which prohibits activities *Shia* ritual teachings.³⁶

²⁹Zulkifli, *The Struggle of The Shi'is in Indonesia*, 269.

³⁰Abdurrahman Wahid, *Ilusi Negara Islam*, 95.

³¹ According to Din Wahid, in Sedayu Gresik, has also become an important part in the spread of Salafi. Besides al-Irsyad boarding School in Salatiga Tenggara also serves as the first Salafi pesantren in Indonesia.

³²Din Wahid, *Nurturing Salafi Manhaj*, 4.

³³Zulkifli, *The Struggle of The Shi'is in Indonesia*, 296.

³⁴Ibid

³⁵ www.syiahinonesia.com

³⁶ As it happened in the city of Bogor that the Bogor Mayor bans *ShiaShia* ritual commemorating the celebration of Ashura. as well as the Mayor of Bogor Circular No. 300/1321-Kesbangpol dated October 22, 2015, the contents of the ban on the Ashura Day celebrations..

The rejection of the existence of the most violent *Shia*, as it is said Anik Farida,³⁷ emerged from Forum Ulama Umat Islam (FUUI). FUUI is an alliance of Islamic groups that are hard to flow heretical rejection. Although the Anik research about the rejection of the existence of *Shia* occurred in Bandung, but the impact of the refusal to spread others. Some figures incorporated in FUUI detail although not formally referred to as the official envoy however, they claimed that the cleric forum supported by Islamic organizations such as Persis, Al-Irsyad, Muhammadiyah, and Nahdlatul Ulama. Nahdlatu Ulama existence becomes very important because this organization in some thought rated at odds with the puritanist. NU's representation in the cleric forum for their delegates from Central Java, KH. Abdul Hamid Baidlowi who attended the meetings of that in his speech said that the *Shia* are very dangerous cult Moslems. Understand *Shia* in which an insult to the Prophet Muhammad and his family and his companions. In addition, he claimed the *Shia* group also doubted the authenticity of the contents of the holy book of Qur'an. As manifestation of the rejection of the *Shia* is through various programs and activities.³⁸

The rejection is always evolving to date is demonstrated through preach, study, and *fatwa*. Anik as stated in her research that the rejection of the *Shia* done through lectures on the occasion of the lecture. As conducted by various Regional FUUI. As teaching that is lead by KH. Athian Ali as anti-*Shia* stance is very effective. The highlight of rejection was held in 2012 at the Majlis Al-Fajr, in Bandung. This meeting was initiated by FUUI by inviting scholars from all over Indonesia, including from MUI, various Islamic organizations and government elements such as the Mayor and Governor of West Java. During the meeting resulted in a *fatwa* that confirms the *Shia* heresy. Based on the *fatwa* that was driven FUUI number 04 / Rabiutsani / 1433 of *Shia* expressed:

1. Persons or groups that believe, teach and spread in whole or in part from the familiar over the *Shia*, who believe they *Shia* follower or not is misguided and misleading, and are outside of Islam.
2. Moslems are required to limit interactions, both personal and group with followers of *Shia* understood to avoid yourself and your family from the influence of their heretical teachings

³⁷Farida, Anik. "Islamic Mass Organization's Responses To Shi'a Muslim in Bandung, West Jawa." *Jurnal PENAMAS* (Balai Pengembangan Agama) Vol.27 (Juli-September, 2014): 159-176.

³⁸<http://www.voaindonesia.com/a/sejumlah-ulama-indonesia-gelar-deklarasi-anti-syiah/> 1897-507.html

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3. The Government of Indonesia is obliged to take action against individuals and groups because it has tarnished the purity of *Shia* at a time to avoid a larger conflict, as happened in other countries

As a follow up of the *fatwa* efforts on supporting the introduction of the *fatwa* that every aspect of government agencies, such as asking for MUI to issue a *fatwa* of apostasy understand *Shia* and cease all activities, request the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Religious Affairs, and the Attorney sublime to revoke the permit entire organizations, foundations or institutions that are under the auspices of sensible *Shia* or Shiite.

While the rejection shown by some figures of NU in various regions in Indonesia is a reaction of the charges *Salafi*'s say that tradition of religious conducted NU as *selametan*, *tahlilan*, *pilgrimage*, *istighosah* and *mawlid* as ritual deviant and contains heresy because not mentioned in Quran and Hadith. The rejection of the idea of the *Salafi* as shown by K.H. Mustafa Aqiel consider that the *Salafi* criticism against traditional religious practices as evidence of their failure to understand and appreciate the traditional propaganda conducted nine trustees (*wali songo*), who adopted the local traditions in their arraignment to make it more acceptable by local people.

As they are Islamized, in his view, these traditions do not contradict islam tenets. Yahya zainal arifin, popularly called buya yahya, of pesantren al-bahja sharply criticizes the *Salafi* methodological approach to the manhaj. Generally, the *Salafis* would say that if someone is a *Salafi* he should follow the al-salaf al shalih by emulating all the attitudes and thoughts of the salaf in understanding the Quran and hadith. This argument, according to buya yahya, is problematic, since the salaf did not set up the methods for approaching the two principle sources of Islamic teachings, the Quran and Hadith. It was imam shafii who first set up this method in his risalah. A true *Salafi* is therefore, for him, a person who follows al-shalafi's metod and those who do not are false *Salafis*.³⁹

³⁹Din Wahid, *Nurturing Salafi Manhaj*, 184.

As the propagation of Islam do the trustees of nine, in the view of Kyai Mustafa Aqil, this tradition does not contradict the teachings of Islam. Yahya Zainal Arifin, (popularly Buya Yahya), the caretaker Pesantren Al Bahjah sharply criticized the *Salafi manhaj* methodological approach. Generally, *Salafi* would say that if someone is *Salafi* he should follow *al-Salaf al-Salih* to imitate all the attitudes and thoughts of the Salaf in understanding the Quran and Hadith. This argument, according to Buya Yahya, problematic, because the Salaf does not regulate the method of approaching the two sources of the principles of Islam, the Quran and Hadith. That Imam Shafi'i who first founded this method in his treatise. Therefore, a *Salafi* the truth is, for him, people who follow the methods of *al-shalafi* and those who are not on falsehood *Salafi*.

6. The Accommodating Response

For this group, the presence of *Salafi* and *Shia* does not matter as long as the educational pattern does not lead to the formation of an exclusive attitudes that lead to acts of intolerance. In view of this group of educational goals is how to make people to be critical, open, tolerant, democratic, and keep the value of humanity in the midst of public life. Whatever the mode of ideology held by the public can not be restricted because they follow a particular ideology or ideology is the right person. The task of education is how to become negotiating process of difference comes amid public life with so there is no conflict.

Unlike the puritanist groups mentioned above, which generally provide sufficient space for the *Salafi* and showed very anti-*Shia* stance. Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, disagreed with violent behavior in the name of ideology to oppress the minority of *Shia* group. Generally, the reasons of unaccommodating from these organizations caused by *Salafi* idea that considered to be a source of violence and a rigid attitude and anti-tradition excess on local religious practices in Indonesia.

In addition, in response to *Shia* presence with the arrogance shown by the majority of the Muslim community in Indonesia regretted by NU and Muhammadiyah Islamic organization. For Muhammadiyah, as stated by Vice Chairman of Muhammadiyah Bandung, H. Ayat Dimiyati, that Sunni and minority *Shia* differences should not lead to consider each other an infidel (*tasyrik*). More Din Syamsuddin, who served as Chairman of PP Muhammadiyah for two periods (2005-2010 and 2010-2015), explicitly states that the concept did not go astray for *Shia*.

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Shia is a part of Islam, in principle, equal to Sunni teachings. As stated by Din Syamsuddin:

"Both the *Shia* and the Sunnis certainly has advantages and disadvantages. Both of them should be addressed by promoting mutual respect and tolerance of each other. The emergence of two schools came after Prophet Muhammad's death so that it can be viewed as a critical outlook on the meaning of Islam and do not be conflicted ".⁴⁰

It could be said that the authority of Islamic organizations and institutions become one of the driving factors behind the conflict difference Sunni and *Shia* sects. In addition to statements of Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama also stated that the notion *Shia* did not go astray and it still recognized as a true religious understanding. As stated by the Chairman of the NU, KH. Said Aqil Siraj:

"The flow of *Shia* in general is not a cult, but only different from the Indonesian Moslems in general. *Shia* is one of the sect of Islam that has existed since 14 centuries ago "⁴¹

Indeed in the teachings of Islam never preaches hatred and discord in mankind. The teachings of Islam never teaches the nature of revenge, malice and hatred to mankind even though the people of different religions. Islam has always called on its followers to love one another, calling to each other to maintain unity and brotherhood, does not discriminate between the sexes with the other sex, the rate of the other tribes, between the schools of one with other schools, between conviction one to another belief and between one country to another country. Human beings in the view of Islam is very honored by God. Every nation and the people who believe is the equivalent rank at the side of God's glory. The difference is the level of piety in God. As in the word of God in the letter (Al-Hujurat [49]: 13)⁴².

Thus the fundamental problems regarding the *Salafi* and *Shia* difference lies in the differences in the understanding of Islam. The existence of divisions between the *Salafi* and *Shia* group, as stated by Abdul Karim Soroush is more influenced by issues of Islamic theology or kalam and fiqh are often synonymous with Sunni

⁴⁰ Quoted on October 2, 2016 edition of *Kompas.com* 06/09/2012.

⁴¹ Quoted on October 2, 2016 from *Tempo.co*, edition 28.08.2012.

⁴² "Verily the noblest among you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you"

groups, and *Shia* groups who identified by experts '*irfani*. If Moslems understand the difference and not a fanatic to understand in believes, then the difference is actually tend to in a harmonious relationship. Both *Salafi* and *Shia* that they should not be too being sectarian. Because the causes of a conflict between two ideologies are caused by excessive ideological fanaticism factors. In bridging the tension between the *Salafi* and *Shia* followers so as not to get stuck on a narrow understanding further described Amin Abdullah the need for a critical understanding that is often referred to as *meta discourse* understanding. Namely, the ability to articulate areas of understanding religious theories or locality of culture. If segregation is not matched by the dialogue, then that will happen is a clash and conflict. Therefore Soroush offer dialogue model epistemology, interpenetration and evolution. Epistemology kalam and fiqh discussed with '*irfani* epistemology, or how to articulate all three social sciences, natural and humane so that from this interpretation embodied in evolution or *basth*, namely *qoobilun linniqosh wa at-taghyir*, in terms of the theory of *qabz* and *basth* is the interpretation of religious texts in the understanding of religion and religious ideas which run dynamic and always changing. Thus the critical approach of Amin Abdullah and theory of *qabz* and *basth* Abdul Karim Soroush in the context of *Salafi* and *Shia* in Indonesia is often played on the issue of Sunni and *Shia*, although in many cases there are differences in the meaning of the concept of a Sunni from the existing Muslim in Indonesia it can be used in explaining how the majority Moslems Indonesia responds to the presence of *Salafi* and *Shia* institutions will come to fruition

C. Conclusions

The basic problem of the *Salafi*'s and *Shia*'s differences are in the existence of differences in interpretation. Inspired by the different understandings that emerged from several groups of Indonesian Moslems. Viewed from a psychological understanding. Moslems in Indonesia, I see that in responding to those institutions are very visible in the matters of faith. So that, the views of the differences will cause their various reactions, either reject or accept the attitude of the community. The ideological factor is a major cause of dispute in response between *Salafi* and *Shia*.

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In general, the response shown by other Indonesian Moslems to the presence of *Salafi* and *Shia* to two categories, namely rejection response, which is a response that is triggered by factors of the religious understanding that do not want to see as dynamic. categorize this group as a group of puritanist that their thought of Islam are influenced by the *Salafi* understanding that is very rigid in understanding Islam. Particularly, in addressing the presence of *Shia* in Indonesia they are making every effort to lead to rejection of the conflict in the community. Then, the rejection of the *Salafi* institutions especially indicated by some figures of NU as a form of maintaining the tradition and culture of the locality that it accused by *Salafi* as deviant from Islam.

Various cases against *Shia* above indicated that a conflict occurred because it was triggered by sentiment among Islamic groups in Indonesia against their disagreement allegedly caused by differences in beliefs. In addition, there are responses that emerged from the another Moslems indicated by the accommodating attitude. They see that the presence of *Salafi* and *Shia* is seen from the perspective of the methodology of understanding Islam seen only in the perspective of theological doctrines. With the ability to understand Islam better methodology of both ideologies, *Salafi* and *Shia* will give produce an open attitude that would create the accommodating attitude. Conversely, when in response not to be based on understanding of Islam methodology will trigger rejection.

Meanwhile, accommodating response is the response shown by Moslems in Indonesia depend on the awareness that is built on the understanding of the critical attitude shown by the intellectuals, especially from the NU and Muhammadiyah as an effort to articulate religious understanding more critically. According to this group, they consider that the tough stance that emerged from some Moslems because there is no capability to articulate the doctrine of the social reality with an understanding of Islam. Thus, in the context of understanding the differences, Moslems are easily trapped in internal conflicts. They pushed the ability of the methodology in understanding Islam. Because with the ability to understand the methodology will be able to bring the values of harmony in difference (harmony in diversity). As stated by Abdulkarim Soroush that the differences in the understanding of Islam must be equipped by the ability to articulate the differences. It is expected to produce the accommodating attitude that is not one-sided and will produce the acceptance of differences (*al-taqabul li al-niqash-wa al-taghyir*).

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