ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP CONTESTATION: EXPLORING THE PRACTICES OF CONSERVATIVE ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN INDONESIA

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Abstract

This paper describes the political contestation in the election of leaders that has occurred in the last five years in Indonesia. Since the reformation era, conservative Islamic movements have gained wide freedom to spread Islamic political ideology such as the idea of upholding Islamic law. This was clearly seen in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election and 2019 Presidential Election, where the conservative Islamic movement voiced practical political aspirations by involving the role of religion. The case that happened to Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) who was suspected of committing blasphemy at the end of 2016, turned into a protest movement that held "Aksi Bela Islam I, II, III" (Action for Defending Islam I, II, III) which was able to mobilize all elements of religious organizations in Indonesia. This movement is also supported by the role of social media which adds to the massive Islamic populism movement to promote the enforcement of Islamic law through the political stage. This is a qualitative research that prioritizes bibliographic sources. The results of this study indicate that the voices of Muslims who are involved in the "Action to Defend Islam" add to the success of the conservatism process which has a dichotomy of political interests to realize religious authoritarianism by using the Qur'anic verses. However, this study also explains the characteristics of the attitudes of leaders in the history of Islamic civilization who uphold egalitarianism that does not conflict with the democratic system because the responsibility of a leader is to create prosperity and justice for all mankind.

Keywords: *Contestation; Islamic Leadership; Conservative Islam.*

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Abstrak

Tulisan ini memaparkan kontestasi politik dalam pemilihan pemimpin yang terjadi dalam lima tahun terakhir di Indonesia. Sejak era reformasi, gerakan Islam konservatif mendapatkan kebebasan secara luas untuk menyebarkan ideologi politik Islam seperti gagasan penegakan syariat Islam. Hal ini terlihat jelas pada Pilgub Jakarta 2017 dan Pilpres 2019, bahwa gerakan Islam konservatif juga menyuarakan aspirasi politik praktis dengan melibatkan peran agama. Kasus yang menimpa Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) yang diduga melakukan penistaan agama pada akhir 2016 lalu, berubah menjadi gerakan protes menggelar "Aksi Bela Islam I, II, III" yang mampu mengerahkan seluruh elemen Ormas keagamaan di Indonesia. Gerakan ini juga didukung oleh peran media sosial yang menambah masifnya gerakan populisme Islam untuk mempromosikan penegakan hukum Islam melalui panggung politik. Artikel ini menggunakan jenis penelitian kualitatif yang mengedepankan sumber kepustakaan. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa suara-suara umat Islam yang terlibat dalam "Aksi Bela Islam" menambah keberhasilan proses konservatisme yang memiliki dikotomi kepentingan politik untuk mewujudkan otoritarianisme agama dengan menggunakan ayat-ayat Alquran. Namun penelitian ini juga menjelaskan karakteristik sikap pemimpin dalam sejarah peradaban Islam yang menjunjung tinggi sikap egalitarianisme yang tidak bertentangan dengan sistem demokrasi. Karena tugas seorang pemimpin harus mampu menciptakan kesejahteraan dan keadilan bagi seluruh umat manusia.

Kata Kunci: *Kontestasi, Kepemimpinan Islam, Islam Konservatif.*

مستخلص

يهدف هذا البحث إلى بيان صراع الخلاف السياسي فى انتخاب الرئاسة الذي وقع فى خمس السنوات الأواخر فى إندونيسيا. منذ العصر الإصلاحي (reformation era)، كان لبعض الحركات الإسلامية كمال الحرية فى نشر الأيديولوجيا الناعمة 'الإسلام السياسي' التي تعارض بكثير من الأحيان مع النظام الديمقراطي. وقد ظهر ذلك بوضوح في انتخابات رئيس محافظة جاكرتا لعام 2017 والانتخابات الرئاسية لعام 2019، حيث أعربت الحركة الإسلامية المُتعصبة 'الإسلام الأصولي' عن تطلعات فكرة السياسة العملية اشتراكا بدور الدين. قضية الإهانة فعلها رئيس المحافظة بجاكرتا باسوكي تجهاجا بورناما (أهوك) (Basuki Tjahaja Purnama/Ahok) في نهاية عام 2016، تُفضِي إلى ظهور الحركة المسماة بـ ' aksi bela Islam Jilid 1,2,3' أي الحركة دفاعا عن الإسلام التي كان تعترض علي هذه القضية. كانت الحركة متمكنة أن تجمع كثيرا من المنظمات الدينية المتنوعة فى إندونيسيا، ومن جانب آخر هذه الحركة تدعم بدور وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي التي تُضيف إلى الحركة الشعبوية الإسلامية الهائلة لتعزيز تطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية من خلال المسرح السياسي. ولذلك هذ البحث يستخدم نوعًا من البحث النوعي الذي يعطي الأولوية من المصادر المكتبية، وتشير نتائج هذه الدراسة إلى أن أصوات المسلمين المشاركين في "العمل للدفاع عن الإسلام" تضيف إلى نجاح العملية 'المتعصبة' التي تنطوي على انقسام الأهداف السياسية لتحقيق الاستبداد الديني باستخدام الآيات القرآنية. ومع ذلك ، فإن هذه الدراسة تشرح أيضًا خصائص مواقف الرؤساء في تاريخ الحضارة الإسلامية الذين يؤيدون المساواة التي لا تتعارض مع النظام الديمقراطي لأن مسؤولية الرئيس هي خلق الرخاء والعدل للبشرية جمعاء.

الكلمات الرئيسة: الخلاف السياسي; الرئاسة الإسلامية، محافظة الإسلامية; إندونيسيا

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A. INTRODUCTION

Since the rise of Islam in the 20th century, Islamic politics and law have undergone universal modernization and development. This development was influenced by figures of Islamic reform such as Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905 AD), Rasyid Rida (1865-1935 AD), Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949 AD), Jamaluddin Al-Afghani (1838-1897 AD), Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966 AD), Muhammad Qutb (1919-2014 AD) and others.[1] These Islamic thinkers produced something new (*tajaddud*) by reforming the theory and methodology of Islamic thought.[2] It was because the social changes that have occurred in the Islamic world lately have increasingly made Islamic decline due to *taklid* (blind-following) and the spread of syncretism. The understanding of *taklid* makes Muslims confined to the previous schools (*mazhabs*) of law so that there is no attempt to come up with the idea of modernizing Islamic law that is dynamic, flexible, and contemporary. So that these reformist Islamic thinkers sought to actualize educational, political, legal, and economic thought by examining the concept of (Islamic) theological modernization which is influenced by Western culture.[3]

In the 1895s, Muhammad Abduh succeeded in formulating the basics of modernization through the development program of the Islamic education system at Al-Azhar university.[4] The reform of the oldest Islamic education system had a partial and universal impact in influencing other developing modern educational institutions in the Middle East. This educational reform lies in the rational idea as a method for developing *ijtihad* in dealing with contemporary problems. Thinking using ratios (reason) is a way to solve the problems and demands of Muslims in the lack of science.[5] This lack of knowledge greatly affects developments in the fields of politics, law, economics, science, which are still a socio-cultural problem that Muslims must face.

However, in the historical record, the renewal of Islamic education from these reformist thinkers also had influenced several aspects of Islamic thought in the modern world. The influence of this thought gave birth to new patterns in studying the interpretation of the Qur'an and hadith which became more diverse in the Middle East to Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. The diversity of the *ijtihad* of these *mujtahids* different understandings

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[1] Munawir Sjadzali, *Islam Dan Tata Negara: Ajaran, Sejarah, Dan Perkembangan* (Jakarta: UI-Press, 1998).

[2] Abul A'la Maududi, *Langkah-Langkah Pembaharuan Islam*, ed. Dadang Kahmad (Bandung: Pustaka, 1995).

[3] H.A.R. Gibb, *Aliran-Aliran Modern Dalam Islam*, ed. L.E. Hakim (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1952).

[4] John L Esposito, *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics* (United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[5] Muhammad Abduh, *Risalah Tauhid* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1979).

of Islam because they were based on the understanding of textual and contextual interpretation. This social phenomenon can be observed from the birth of Islamic schools (*kalam*) which began to emerge and carry ideologies based on symbolic Islamic movements.[6] Islamic political contestations also influence political and legal policies which often trigger tensions and conflicts between these Islamic groups. At first, the conflict arose due to differences in doctrines of religious sects such as fundamentalism, neo-fundamentalism, conservatism, modernism, and neo-modernism, some of which did not have an egalitarian attitude between groups.

The seeds of debate that sparked war conflicts occurred after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. In the early days of *al-Khulaf ' al-R shid n* (the Four Guided Caliphs), Muslims were led by the first caliph, namely Abu Bakr Ash Siddiq (until around 40H/660 AD). At that time, Medina state was headed by a caliph (system of government). However, the government was inseparable from the people, because *ahaba* (the Companions of the Prophet) in Medina always advised and participated in the process of making legislative and executive institutions. At that time, Islamic politics was difficult to separate or even distinguish from the government system (Islamic rule).[7]

Therefore, at the time of *al-Khulaf ' al-R shid n*, the legislation was only to control social norms and the civility of the people. The reason was that, in practice, the legislature was a joint work of the *ahaba* to regulate human ethics and morals. However, over time, the Islamic rule system underwent significant changes due to the replacement of the dynastic system in Islam. During the Umayyad dynasty, the Islamic government was built into an autocratic system separate from the *umma* (people). The rulers of the Umayyad dynasty expanded and ran their government from the city of Damascus. The caliphs during the Umayyad period were generally only guided by the Qur'an and Sunnah. But if there was any problem, the Qur'an and hadith were only interpreted by advisors and officials based on the need for political interests to provide a legal basis.[8]

The history of war and the implementation of various policies could not be separated from the political interests of the rulers. This change occurred since Islam began to spread to Europe, Southeast Asia, and other parts of the world. Political-legal geneology can be traced

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[6] Aksin Wijaya, *Dari Membela Tuhan Ke Membela Manusia: Kritik Atas Nalar Agamaisasi Kekerasan* (Bandung: Mizan, 2018).

[7] Fazlur Rahman, *Islam: Sejarah Pemikiran Dan Peradaban* (Bandung: Mizan, 2017).

[8] Shireen T. Hunter, *Politik Kebangkitan Islam: Keragaman Dan Kesatuan* (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 2001).

during the *iffin* war between Ali bin Abi Talib and Muawiyah bin Sofyan.[9] In the civil war, at first Muawiyah interpreted Qur'anic verses for political purposes in order to gain the power. As a result of this war, Muslims began to experience internal divisions and formed sects within Islam. The division of Muslims began to build sects to formulate doctrines according to their religious understanding and political beliefs which they followed as *ijtihad* and *jih d* according to the leaders of the schools they adhered to.

From the brief explanation about political history, the codification of Islamic law, and the Islamic leadership system in Muslim civilization to the current situation above, this trouble still poses problems that are used for political mobilization, especially in Indonesia. General issues such as the system of government, ethics of Islamic leaders, politicization of Quranic verses, authoritarianism, conservatism, and the fading of *tas muh* (tolerance) between groups make these issues often legitimized to create power relations of practical political interests. It then has an impact on the constellation in the public sphere that can foster Islamic populism as an identity political movement.[10] After the fall of the New Order in 1998, Islamism movements in Indonesia began to emerge and voiced Islamic political aspirations to restore and fight for the enforcement of Islamic law.[11] The change of era has indeed marked the process of Islamic populism and democracy being increasingly open and at the same time changing the political landscape of Indonesia.[12]

This study uses qualitative methods or library research that focuses on Islamic political upheaval during the general election that has occurred in Indonesia in the last five years. Because the post-election in the last five years has caused a lot of divisions between religious communities, especially Muslims. This was clearly seen in the 2016 Jakarta gubernatorial election and the 2019 presidential election, that the conservative Islamic movement also voiced practical political aspirations by involving the role of religion as a political commodity. The case that happened to Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), who was suspected of committing blasphemy at the end of 2016, turned into a protest movement holding "Islamic Defense Action I, II, III" which was able to mobilize all elements of religious organizations in Indonesia. Besides, the rise of Islamic populism with the support of

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[9] Wijaya, *Dari Membela Tuhan Ke Membela Manusia: Kritik Atas Nalar Agamaisasi Kekerasan*.

[10] Noorhaidi Hassan, *Ulama Dan Negara-Bangsa: Membaca Masa Depan Islam Politik Di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: PusPIDep, 2019).

[11] Ngainun Naim and As'aril Muhajir, "ISLAMIC RADICALISM AND DE-RADICALIZATION STRATEGIES: A CONTRIBUTION OF NURCHOLISH MADJID," *Jurnal Ilmiah* 20, no. 2 (2020): 235–53, https://doi.org/10.22373/jiif.v0i0.5447.

[12] Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad ; Islam, Militansi, Dan Pencarian Identitas Di Indonesia Pasca-Orde Baru* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2008).

the media has also added to the problem of the electability of leaders and the democratic system in Indonesia has begun to be disrupted. Several sources of literature and case studies in the field will be analyzed descriptively. By using the representative concept, it will certainly raise a hypothesis from this research, the extent to which this Islamism movement can affect the political order and democratic system in Indonesia.

B. DISCUSSION

1. Conservative Islamic Movement in Indonesia

The presence of religious organizations complements the votes formed by political parties. Noorhaidi said this group is a conservative Islam who always wants to restore the foundation of life based on the Qur'an and hadith. Among these conservative Islamic groups are Barisan Pemuda Ka'bah (the Kaaba Youth Front), Pam Swakarsa, Pendekar Banten (Banten Warriors), Gerakan Pemuda Islam (GPI, Islamic Youth Movement), Front Hizbullah Bulan Bintang, and others. They often work with political parties to support various policies as well as create political action when elections arrive. Several cases that can be observed occur when this conservative Islamic movement can clash political and democratic contestations in fighting for absolute truth when the democratic party (election) takes place.[13]

For example, at the end of 2016 when Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) was suspected of committing blasphemy. When the political contestation in Jakarta gubernatorial election took place, Ahok held a political speech to mention Qur'anic holy verse in *Al-M 'ida*; 51 in Kepulauan Seribu, Jakarta. This issue in a fact triggered the response and anger of Muslims. They then gathered and staged a demonstration by mobilizing an action called the "Gerakan Bela Islam 212" (212 Defending Islam Movement) due to their disapproval of Ahok's speech, which was alleged to have blasphemed a verse of the Qur'an. This phenomenon is very interesting to track Islamic populism as a massive movement that fights for Islamic politics and Islamic law.[14]

Ahmad Najib Burhani considered that the essence of "*Aksi Bela Islam I, II, III*" (Action for Defending Islam I, II, III) is a process of conservatism that has a dichotomy of political interests in order to realize religious authoritarianism by using Qur'anic verses (politicization of verses). The action led by Habib Rizieq Syihab succeeded in mobilizing all

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[13] Hamzah Fansuri, "Lini Masa Ekspresi Populisme Islam: Mendebatkan Keyakinan Di Abad Yang Tak Wajar," *Jurnal Maarif Inatitute* 12, no. 1 (2017): 71–86.

[14] Assyari Abdullah, "Membaca Komunikasi Politik Gerakan Aksi Bela Islam 212: Antara Politik Identitas Dan Ijtihad Politik Alternatif," *Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 41, no. 2 (2017): 202–12, https://doi.org/10.24014/an-nida.v41i2.4654.

social elements including the largest Muslim mass organizations in Indonesia: NU, Muhammadiyah and several MUI leaders.[15] Starting from President Jokowi, and several important government officials and religious leaders attended the protest at Monas by holding protests with various demands to defend Islam and continued Friday prayers in congregation. Conservative Islamic movements (such as FPI, HTI) have succeeded in provoking all elements of the Islamic community to carry out violent protests as a form of demands to defend God (theocentric understanding).

In this case, the ethics and attitudes of Indonesian Muslims prioritize emotional (rigid) and arrogant feelings. They often do not consider what Jalaluddin Rakhmat and Ahmad Syafii Maarif have said to prioritize morality over *fiqh* in upholding political attitudes. Attitudes and ethics in politics should also have the values of egalitarianism and understanding of humanity so as not to cause internal conflicts and social inequality. In the end, this Islamic populism movement increasingly shows the existence of the values contained in democracy always vis--vis with Islamic politics that are exclusive.

It could be that this Islamic populism movement caused a commotion in discussing law-politics in the name of "the people" as a means of electability of political interests. Vedi R. Hadiz explained that this populist politics often creates theoretical debates about ideology, mobilization, and challenges in dealing with liberal ideas about democratic politics.[16] Populism has a premise that can be categorized into three forms, they are ideological, political communication, and lifestyle. This typology has a difference if it is interpreted using a political approach. From this typology, populism tends to move in the dimension of religion (Islam). If Islamic populism has developed, it will certainly affect the political constellation in Indonesia. So that Islamic populism can endanger the sustainability of democratic values, therefore it is necessary to study it with multiple interpretations.[17]

Populism is closely related to various issues of recognition, representation, advocacy by political elites or oligarchs. As if populism can represent "a reflection of democracy." Wasisto Raharjo Jati said that the term populism can actually mean both karicative and curative to the implementation of contemporary democracy that has been taking place so far. This term arises from developing countries whose actual democratic transition process as a constitutional system has not yet experienced perfection. This has often led to the hijacking of

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[15] Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Aksi Bela Islam: Konservatisme Dan Fragmentasi Otoritas Keagamaan," *Jurnal Maarif Inatitute* 12, no. 1 (2017): 12–21.

[16] Vedi R. Hadiz, *Populisme Islam Di Indonesia Dan Timur Tengah* (Depok: LP3ES, 2019).

[17] Wasisto Raharjo Jati, "Dari Umat Menuju Ummah?: Melacak Akar Populisme Kelas Menengah Muslim Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Maarif Inatitute* 12, no. 1 (2017): 22–36.

new democracies and oligarchs. Therefore, growing populism is a form of religious expression that develops in society. Populism moves in transformation and negotiation in order to create a middle-class movement. Wasisto Raharjo Jati has succeeded in elaborating populism and can be tabulated as follows:

Table 1. Classification of Populism

No.	Typology of Populism	Political Action Form	Actor	Goal
1.	Populism as Political Ideology	Extra Political Movement	Class alliance in Society	Representation, Advocacy of Aspiration
2.	Populism as a Political Style	Welfare state policy, Klintelisme	New non oligarchic elite, Middle Class	Community Loyalty to Government
3.	Populism as Political Communication	Regime formation (Peronism, Chavizmo, Soekarnoism, etc.)	Populist, Lower Middle Class	Community Patronage

The table above provides an overview of the conservative Islamic movement in the struggle for political power in Indonesia. It seems that the idea of Islamic renewal is not only moving towards scientific theology (modernity school) but is more inclined towards conservative theology (fundamental school). From the social phenomenon of the *Gerakan Bela Islam 212* and the demonstrations of Muslims after the 2019 presidential election, it was felt that identity factors (ethnicity and religion) became an indicator of voters determining votes. Arya Fernandes analyzed the case because of the tendency of (Muslim) voters at the national level after the DKI Jakarta election and the 212 action. Then it affected the 212 electoral movement in the acquisition of votes for presidential candidates or political parties.[18] This identity politics is one of the indicators of Anis Baswedan-Sandiaga Uno's victory in the 2017 DKI Jakarta election as well. The results of CSIS research show that Anis did win in urban villages with large Muslim voters and in densely populated areas in Jakarta.

However, indications of this success are different from the 2019 presidential political contestation, even though the Prabowo-Sandi camp dominated supporters of the mass 212 action movement as a form of Muslim aspirations in politics. However, Jokowi's political strategy seems to be very successful in balancing identity politics between camps. Jokowi chose to partner with Ma'ruf Amin and cancel to partner with Mahfud MD is an action or political strategy that is considered appropriate, because the pairing of Jokowi and Ma'ruf Amin can win some Muslim voters or at least provide stability for Muslim voters.

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[18] Arya Fernandes, "Politik Identitas Dalam Pemilu 2019: Proyeksi Dan Efektivitas," *Center For Strategic and International Studies*, 2018.

Based on CSIS survey data in April 2018 between presidential candidates Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin and Prabowo-Sandi, both candidates actually have regional points that are superior to between camps, such as the success of Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin's vote which received abundant votes in Central Java and East Java. Meanwhile, Prabowo-Sandi managed to get the votes of Muslims in North Sumatra and West Java. So that the aggregate of five provinces shows that 69.7% of respondents have heard of the 212 action, and about 60% of them admit to support the action. Meanwhile, the average participation of the action is 6%.

Based on this data, it can be concluded that in five provinces, and when viewed from the political preferences of supporters of the 212 mass action, Prabowo-Sandi did have a higher vote than Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin. As many as 48.5% of supporters during the 212 action claimed to support Prabowo-Sandi and 41.4% said they supported Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin. The support from the mass sympathizers of the 212 action also seemed to have been mobilized from various political parties. The mass supporters of the 212 action were spread across various parties with Islamic and nationalist ideologies. The populist movement was created by the oligarchs to mobilize the masses and at the same time legitimize the interests of the rulers.

However, it can cause fraternity. The political contestation of the 2019 presidential election contains many religious conflicts, hate speech, hoaxes, and slander. The issue of Islamic political contestation if it is not balanced with an egalitarian political attitude and forgets the importance of ethical aspects and Islamic values, then the politics will experience absurdity in substance. This indicates that the spread of politicization of religion without aesthetics and humanism in politics can cause division of mankind. So that it can be said that identity politics cannot create an egalitarian system for leaders as contained in the Qur'an and hadith.

2. Islamic Leadership in the Qur'an

Islam regulates various matters surrounding social life. Including regulating leadership in Islam. In the Qur'an, leadership is expressed in various terms: *Khalifah*, *Imam*, and *Ulil al-Amri*.[19] In the Qur'an, Islamic leadership is explained from the story of the Prophet D w d. The Qur'an says:

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[19] Muhammad Harfin Zuhdi, "Konsep Kepemimpinan Dalam Perspektif Islam," *AKADEMIKA: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 19, no. 1 (2014): 35–57.

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"O David, verily We have made you caliph (ruler) on earth, so judge (cases) between people with justice and do not follow your passions, for it will lead you astray from the way of Allah... (Sura 38:26)."

The interpretation of the leadership story above is the history of the story of the Prophet David getting trials (tests) from God. Prophet David was tested not to be influenced by the air (lust) at that time. The desires and temptations of egoistic desires experienced in humans that should be controlled by reason. This is where there needs to be a definitive guide, in enforcing the concept of sharia (the way). Curbing the air and preventing its bad influence is the function and purpose of Islamic sharia.[20] The normative nature, many describe sharia as commands (worship) for the activities of Muslims. Because the command will be related to one's ethics (adab and morals).

This is different from the science of fiqh which of course only explains the science of law which is sometimes acronymized as sharia. But the two are indeed different, because sharia is closer to revelation, while fiqh extracts law from the Qur'an and Sunnah developed by jurists with ijtihad. Therefore, sharia has a fairly large scope, covering all human activities. While fiqh is narrower in scope and mostly only discusses matters relating to practical legal rules (*al-ahk m al-'amaliyya*). If the path of sharia is laid by Allah and His Messenger, the building of fiqh is enforced by human efforts through the concept of ijtihad.[21]

Like Imam Al-Mawardi's ijtihad in his book *al-Ahk m al-Sul niyya wa al-Wil ya al-D niyya*. The book contains the constitutional legal system and the process of selecting leadership in Islamic terms. Imam Al-Mawardi explained historically about ijtihad the appointment of an Islamic leader (head of state) is obligatory according to *ijm '* (consensus). However, this issue is also inseparable from the debate among scholars on the method of determining leaders based on sharia or ratios.[22] The debate among ulama on the appointment of Islamic leaders needs to be considered clearly and rationally in order to control people's behavior by pursuing a legal system that regulates social benefits. This needs to be done by leaders to create justice and prosperity in handling cases of injustice and resolving existing disputes. Al-Mawardi refers to the Qur'an in Sura Al-Nisa: 59.

"O you who believe, obey Allah and obey the Messenger, and ulil amri among you .... (Surah An-Nisa: 59)."

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[20] Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Membumikan Syariah: Pergulatan Mangaktualkan Islam*, ed. Miki Salman (Bandung: Mizan, 2013).

[21] Hashim Kamali.

[22] Al-Mawardi, *Hukum Tata Negara Dan Kepemimpinan Dalam Takaran Islam (Penerjemahan) Abdul Hayyie Al-Kattani* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2000).

This verse clearly explains that there is a need for a leader (head of state) who can have an impact on the stability of the life of the nation-state. The leader is also a representation of the purpose of life in creating a state order that upholds *k ffa* (completely) Islamic values.[23] Al-Mawardi also quoted a hadith from Hisham bin Urwah whose chain reached Abu Hurairah, that the Prophet once gave an explanation of the character of future leaders. The Prophet seems to have guessed that in the future, not all leaders will have good, capable, and fair qualities, but it is also possible that leaders also have bad qualities, are repressive, and authoritarian. Thus, al-Mawardi's step in offering the concept of an Islamic leader cannot be separated from absolute requirements as a consideration in choosing a leader.

Understandably, appointing the head of state is an obligation that must be accounted for from a socio-moral aspect. According to al-Mawardi, the attitude of the leader must include; have credibility, have knowledge, have opinions that assume the values of wisdom for social benefit. Do not let the *ijtihad* of Islamic thinkers be considered not to make a major contribution to Islamic politics, because if there is no space for freedom such as social criticism, expressing opinions will result in repressive actions, of course it does not reflect political attitudes that are built on the ethical values of Islamic politics according to the Qur'an and hadith. Sayyid Qutb emphasizes understanding the nature of Islam means understanding human values. The Islamic political system should reflect the attitude of prioritizing justice, humanity, rather than power. If the essence in the verses of the Qur'an and the perspective of Islamic thinkers is prioritized to build the leaders' frame of mind, this can have an impact on an egalitarian legal-political system.[24]

3. *The Role of Social Media in Fostering Post-truth*

The major role of social media involvement in conservative Islamic political movements is to disseminate textual interpretations of Al-Qur'an and hadith textual interpretations to mobilize the masses for practical political interests through social media. Social media presence does not always deliver opportunities or positive impacts but also poses many challenges for humans.[25] If you look at the enforcement and interpretation of the verses of the Qur'an, it should not prioritize textualization and politicization of verses as a means for certain interests. From the phenomenon of *Aksi Bela Islam 212,* Ahmad Najib

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[23] Al-Mawardi.

[24] Sayyid Qutub, *Keadilan Sosial Dalam Islam* (Bandung: Pustaka, 1984).

[25] Muhammad Mundzir et al., "Mediatization of Hadith and the Spirit of Da'wah Moderation in Infographic Content of Online Media," *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 22, no. 64 (2023): 55–79.

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Burhani believes that the protest is an act of conservatism and fragmentation of religious authority. The series of the protest stems from demands that Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) be imprisoned because he is considered to have insulted Islam, in one of his speeches in the Thousand Islands on September 27 2016. In Ahok's speech, essentially speaking about policies and empowerment programs grouper cultivation. He assured the residents of the Kepulauan Seribu that this program would still be implemented even though he was not re-elected as governor of DKI Jakarta in the February 2017 election.

> "You can, in your little heart, ladies and gentlemen, don't vote for me because you were lied to using Surah Al Maidah 51 all kinds of things. That's your right, ladies and gentlemen. If you feel you can't vote because you're afraid of going to hell, you'll be fooled, oh well, that's okay, because this is your personal calling….This program will just go on. So ladies and gentlemen, you don't have to feel bad because their conscience can't choose Ahok."

These are excerpts from several sentences that Ahok conveyed in the speech.[26] The dynamics of Islamic political contestation in Indonesia above represent religious authoritarianism towards the election of leaders in the democracy system in Indonesia. The conservative Islamic movement took advantage of this momentum by making the assumption that the criteria in determining Muslim leaders must prioritize Muslim leaders. From the case of Ahok, the conservative Islamic movement wants to bring back religious authority as a way to paralyze the democratic system in Indonesia. Assumptions or public doctrines then move to religious dogma due to addiction to social media which often contains fake news, causing the spread of religious populism (Islam) in excess.

McLuhan revealed that the media is an extension of the five senses that humans have. This means that humans can use media such as telephones to communicate remotely, humans can get information from events that are so far away by using television, etc. In other words, the telephone is an extension of the ear and television is an extension of the eye.[27] In this post-truth era, politics and religion have a strong dichotomy as a way to legitimize the masses to deliver prospective leaders to the throne of power. This issue also often triggers hoax phenomena such as what happened in the 2019 presidential election. Political contestation raises fragments or social emotions due to hate propaganda on social media. This idea also understands that the term post-truth was born from the concern of many people who are full of observation of the concept of truth and feel that truth is being attacked and abused. This

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[26] Burhani, "Aksi Bela Islam: Konservatisme Dan Fragmentasi Otoritas Keagamaan."

[27] Mohammad Zamroni, Yanti Dwi Astuti, and Achmad Zuhri, "Religious Radicalism Frame in The Online Media News (Framing Analysis Reporting Of 'ISIS' In Republika.Co.Id and Tempo.Co)," *Jurnal Ilmiah Islam Futura* 21, no. 1 (2021): 85, https://doi.org/10.22373/jiif.v0i0.5837.

indicates that there are historical and geopolitical boundaries that need to be established in order to understand the post-truth crisis suffered by Western media and political institutions, both at the national level and in the international arena. The concept of post-truth periodization can generally be used to understand the historical phase that marks the crisis of Western countries in upholding the democratic system, both in public and domestic matters.[28]

For example, the political picture in Indonesia, both at the regional and national levels, such as the DKI Jakarta Pilkada and the presidential election, is dominated by post-truth political theater with political maneuvers by elites to encourage racist narratives and emotionally and rationally manipulate them to distort objectivity. the clearest component of post-truth political practice. In this case, on this occasion, we can clearly see how the practice of post-truth politics in Indonesia occurs in a systematic, structured, and well-designed space, no matter what happens the media is done offline or online.

The politics of online post-truth is executed through the massive spread of hoaxes. Social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Whatsapp, are the dominant platforms where many hoaxes are produced and spread. Unfortunately, fake news is dominated by issues of religious primordialism and its attributes. When offline, the emergence of post-truth politics is marked by the behavior of political elites who tend to intimidate and use political propaganda, such as carrying out identity politics formed by sarcastic and discriminatory comments, mobilizing religious groups, and giving negative images and stigmas to certain religious groups.[29]

According to Haryatmoko, the situation that prompted the emergence of this post-truth era was due to the acceptance of the community.[30] First, a form of devaluation of truth takes place as a result of the narratives of politicians who spread demagogy on social media; second, many people feel comfortable with the information that has been selected without ensuring the certainty of the news; third, the media emphasizes sensation so that only new, spectacular and sensational news deserves to be called worth news. This tendency causes and fosters the development of hoaxes. The spread of the hoax phenomenon due to the weakening of objectivity and credibility of information is supported by the tendency of the community (Muslims) to use alternative media such as: WhatsApp, Facebook, personal blogs, Youtube,

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[28] Gabriele Cosentino, *Social Media and the Post-Truth World Order: The Global Dynamics of Disinformasion* (Switzerland: Palgrave macmillan, 2020).

[29] Zainuddin Syarif, Syafiq A. Mughni, and Abd Hannan, "Post-Truth and Islamophobia Narration in the Contemporary Indonesian Political Constellation," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 10, no. 2 (December 2020): 199–225, https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v10i2.199-225.

[30] Haryatmoko Haryatmoko, "Mencari Kebijakan Di Era Post-Truth: Menghadapi Hoaks, Emosi Sosial, Dan Populisme Agama," *Majalah Basis* 5–6 (2019).

Twitter and others. This alternative media is often a medium that is easy to spread lies (fake news) due to personal assumptions that defeat the relativization of truth. Personal opinion becomes a weapon or authority of truth that defeats the facts of truth. So Haryatmoko also concludes and marks the occurrence of the hoax phenomenon in this post-truth era.

> "First, the breadth of access to information content thanks to the digitization of communications; second, the public can create their own information through social media; third, the democratization of media and citizen journalism compensates for public dissatisfaction with mass media information and disillusionment with politics; fourth, people are more susceptible to receiving wrong information because communities of the same ideology and belief have developed; fifth, technology has distorted the truth because viral issues are considered more important than information quality and ethics; and sixth, the truth is no longer falsified or denied, but the truth becomes number two."[31]

The fabricated truth often occurs in political matters. Hoax is a powerful way used by politicians to win the battle and contestation of interests. Political movements also bring up sentimental issues rather than thinking rationally. This weakens the consciousness of thinking and produces fragments or mass emotions due to prioritizing tradition in religious dogma (*taqlīd*). Issues related to religious populism are indeed very sensitive. Because, religious populism can function as an ideology that gives symbolic legitimacy to conquer the public sphere.

Haryatmoko gave a serious critique that the key to the success of religious populism lies in its capabilities in three respects: first, being able to provide certainty, that is, in the context of global economic uncertainty, unemployment and injustice, religious populism promises a just economy and true brotherhood through a moral revolution. Religious populism gives a definite identity, namely belonging to a group that gives social stability, status, outlook on life, way of thinking and ethos. Second, religion fosters the belief that people are in contact with the deepest meaning of their lives; and third, the reference to the ultimate goal of life provides justification and a critical attitude towards the order it rejects.[32] Starting from the positive values of religion, demagogic politicians cunningly manipulate it to offer a new collective imaginary to replace the imaginary that is in crisis.

The moral crisis caused by the role of social media has succeeded in making people controllable. This system is the same as the algorithm. Algorithmic behavior is caused by our daily dependence on social media which is becoming more and more paradoxical and excessive. This has an impact on ethics, morals, religion, which are often forgotten due to our

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[31] Haryatmoko.
[32] Haryatmoko.

bodies becoming modern mechanical bodies.[33] Bodies are increasingly likely to be manipulated and controlled by the companies behind social media (Bummer). In the post-truth era, social media causes public interactive spaces to experience falsehoods due to the degradation of social norms.

In addition, social media is also used to spread hoaxes, hate speech, and others, social media is also an intensification of global market commodities. Social media has become a geopolitical tool of digitization to observe the impacts of global developments in various countries.[34] Freedom of expression in the public sphere (social media) also has an impact on Islamic politics in Indonesia in fostering intolerance. Whereas in the history of Islamic civilization, modern Islamic political systems tend to have egalitarian, democratic, participatory values and uphold social justice. The impact of the decline of the Islamic political system that upholds human values is due to the spread of fundamental Islamic doctrines that are contrary to the values of Islamic humanism (anthropocentric).

4. Constitutional System Contest

In Indonesia, fundamental Islamic doctrine cannot be separated from the tradition of cultural development in Egypt, the Middle East. The rise of religious violence and the spread of intolerance in a democratic country like Indonesia are due to the rampant activity of mass organizations taking vigilante action. They consider religion to be a pretext for regulating the issue of authoritarianism. The Islamic populism movement has become more repressive and leads in bureaucratic realms in order to open up opportunities through the target point of electoral democracy.[35] The Islamic populism movement has succeeded in designing opportunistic politics to bind the masses who do not understand the struggles of Islamic leaders.

One example is the ideological indoctrination carried out by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) since entering educational spaces (academic community) which seem rigid and textual. This movement voiced the spirit of pan-Islamism that had been developed by Jamaluddin al-Afghani and Rasyid Rida since the 1871s. Islamic populism like this aims to restore the heyday of Islam by engaging in politics to realize sharia (Islamic state).[36] The concept of

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[33] Jaron Lanier, *Ilusi Media Sosial: Sepuluh Argumen Tentang Paradoks Medsos* (Yogyakarta: Cantrik, 2019).

[34] Agus Sudibyo, *Jagat Digital: Pembebasan Dan Penguasaan* (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2019).

[35] Hadiz, *Populisme Islam Di Indonesia Dan Timur Tengah*.

[36] Sidratahta Mukhtar, *Dinamika Politik Islam Dalam Dunia Yang Berubah* (Yogyakarta: Aynat Publishing, 2017).

statehood in the HTI political system is very different universally in the concept of state administration that has been built by the Indonesian nation. This movement considers that Muslims who still use the democratic system are considered infidels and do not practice the state system according to religion (Islam).

The justification and pronunciation of the word "infidel" during the political contestation in 2019 also seemed to divide Muslims in Indonesia. The issue of differences in political support has led to rampant internal conflicts on social media. The difference in exclusive Islamic views actually only lies in the problem of understanding the interpretation and the democratic system. Whereas a government system based on democratic principles is a real concept of integration in creating prosperity and justice for the community. In historical records, during the era of *al-Khulaf ' al-R shid n*, the caliphs decided various social issues ranging from civil to criminal matters, using a deliberation system.

We interpret the concept of deliberation at that time as the same as the Islamic democratic system that became the system in Indonesia. In essence or essence, Islamic values and sharia values have been embodied in the concept. We can see an example of history when the Prophet established a state in Medina. In making policies regarding citizenship, the Prophet gave a decision that created comfort for all religious people. The method was taken by making agreements "Medina Charter" with various ethnic groups, and religious stakeholders. In the end, the Prophet succeeded in forming a society that could coexist without conflict of violence and power.[37]

The life of the Prophet and his Companions in Medina highly respected inter-religious tolerance. Literally, they (non-Muslims) get protection from Muslims in various ways, such as being free to follow the scriptures and the application of their laws. For centuries, the constitutional system built with the Islamic system always upholds plurality, humanism, and tolerance. However, at that time the Islamic government system was also inseparable from the concept of *ahl al- imma*, that protected people were obliged to pay taxes to the government as a substitute for freedom of religion and security. The attitude of the Prophet as a leader figure was so wise in implementing the political-legal system to create social benefits.

The ethics and example of the Prophet recorded in the history of Islamic civilization provide knowledge that how to lead Muslims is very concerned with humanist values which will certainly be able to produce an egalitarian leader attitude. So, if the leadership contestation in the geopolitical area uses a democratic system, it is not necessary to use

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[37] Sohail H. Hashmi dkk., *Etika Politik Islam: Civil Society, Pluralisme, Dan Konflik* (Jakarta: ICIP, 2005).

religion as a benchmark for determining the leader that must be adhered to, but the importance of observing and understanding the conditions that al-Mawardi has put forward when explaining Islamic leadership.

Siti Aminah Caniago made a comparative study by writing Islamic and conventional leadership.[38] Conventional leadership is defined as leadership that occurs outside of leadership according to Islam, although the leadership system partially adopts Islamic elements, this conventional leadership also comes from various sources, both in terms of literature and experience. Consciously or not, this conventional leadership adheres to many Islamic teachings, namely a leadership system that is in line with Islamic teachings.

This method of selecting leaders with an electoral system and determining leaders conventionally with the principle of objectivity is what can advance the civilization of a nation-state that upholds a democratic system. The contestation of Islamic politics as a debate in the government system often has a desire for power and cannot pursue the principles and values of justice. Whereas the purpose of justice is built with the human heart in the form of *tas muh*, glory and height. The spiritual goal that exists in this religion is a part that complements the obligations of the shariah in which it guarantees the guarantor of the obedience, willingness and application of the shariah with the implementation of the obligations. Spiritual ideas also provide high and noble human values that are free from the confines of various kinds of demands and from legal pressure and shariah coercion.[39]

Islam creates justice and welfare for humans which includes all aspects that it builds on two main pillars: the conscience that exists in humans, and the implementation of sharia in society. Islam combines the strengths of one with another so that it can flow in the heart, or in the human mind without forgetting the weaknesses that humans have and their needs. The Islamic political authoritarianism of the conservative Islamic movement raises assumptions and a dichotomy of public spaces as ammunition to launch attacks on textual doctrine. The democratic system has taught that in Muslim-majority countries (Indonesia) to determine the fate of the country, the community (*umma*) need to ijtihad and consider the values taught in the study of the Qur'anic approach.[40]

Ahmad Syafii Maarif explained the humanist values and principles of Islamic political ethics. His view on the issue of the rise of Islamic populism moving to target the success of

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[38] Siti Aminah Chaniago, "Kepemimpinan Islam Dan Konvensional (Sebagai Studi Perbandigan)," *Religia* 13, no. 2 (October 2017): 239–54, https://doi.org/10.28918/religia.v13i2.184.

[39] Qutub, *Keadilan Sosial Dalam Islam*.

[40] Fazlur Rahman, *Major Themes of The Qur'an* (Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980).

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Islamic political revival cannot be separated from the socio-historical approach.[41] This benchmark can be proven from the history of the most legendary Islamic leader or figure named Salahuddin Al-Ayyubi (1137-1193). The success of Salahuddin al-Ayyubi in reclaiming Jarusalem in 1187 did not make Islamic civilization at that time independent of the aristocratic-dynastic political system. It was because the tradition of the Islamic political system still upholds the traditional system for determining the lineage of leaders from the Arab tribes.

The continuity of the dynastic political system has an impact on inequality in the objectivity of determining leaders. We seem to forget the egalitarian principles. Ma'arif revealed that in the post truth era, we need to cultivate the doctrine of egalitarianism. In historical reflection, Muslims after the Prophet and *al-Khulaf ' al-R shid n* seemed to have minimal access to Islamic leaders who are egalitarian for social purposes. Conflicts between leaders for the sake of power are often recorded in the literature, that egoistic attitudes and principles always defeat egalitarian principles which never get a reasonable space.[42]

This issue has an impact on the development of religious doctrine in Indonesia. After the Reformation, the current wave of Islamic populism can be divided into typologies: exclusive Islam, inclusive Islam, and pluralist Islam. The developing paradigm of Islamic thought creates contestation in seizing absolute truth.[43] This struggle is a threat to grow radicalism and anarchism, and terrorism for the nation-state (Indonesia) in the political arena. Because terrorism is a serious problem for humanity in the world.[44] Ma'arif strongly criticized the exclusive understanding of Islam in viewing the interpretation of the Qur'an which was too textual. If exclusive Islamic groups arise, they can trigger a threat to the continuation of democratization. Discourses and actions to defend Islam that they carry out in public spaces often trigger acts of intolerance and violate the principles of democracy and human rights

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[41] Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam Dalam Bingkai Keindonesiaan Dan Kemanusiaan: Sebuah Refleksi Sejarah* (Bandung: Mizan, 2009).

[42] Rahman, *Major Themes of The Qur'an*.

[43] Aksin Wijaya, *Kontestasi Merebut Kebenaran Islam Di Indonesia: Dari Beriman Secara Teologi Ke Beriman Secara Humanis* (Yogyakarta: IRCiSoD, 2019).

[44] Mundi Rahayu, "The Discourse of Radicalism and Family Roles in Standing Against Radicalism Represented in Garin's Nugroho Film 'Mata Tertutup,'" *Jurnal Ilmiah Islam Futura* 20, no. 1 (February 2020): 105–19, https://doi.org/10.22373/jiif.v20i1.5790; Sanusi Ismail et al., "Religious Radicalism and Islamic Universities in Aceh: Between Campus, Environment and Family," *Samarah* 5, no. 2 (2021): 1044–68, https://doi.org/10.22373/SJHK.V5I2.10958; Ahmad Rajafi, Yasin Yetta, and Nur Allan Lasido, "Deradicalism in the Family at Tahuna, Sangihe Islands, North Sulawesi," *Samarah* 6, no. 1 (2022): 369–90, https://doi.org/10.22373/SJHK.V6I1.12445; Fuad Thohari et al., "The Implications of Understanding Contextual Hadith on Religious Radicalism (Case Study of Darus Sunnah International Institute for Hadith Sciences)," *Samarah* 5, no. 2 (2021): 710–40, https://doi.org/10.22373/SJHK.V5I2.11124..

freedom. In Noorhaidi Hassan's view, there are three main criticisms given by Ma'arifto exclusive Islamic groups.[45]

First, the exclusive Islamic group understands that Shari'a is directly interpreted as law and simplistically does not see the rapidly growing reality and social-culture. Second, Ma'arif criticized the exclusive understanding of Islam that could not provide a space for scientific discussion and rejected the opinions of inclusive Islamic thought and pluralist Islam in the discourse of discussing Islamic government. Third, Ma'arif also reminded that the basic problem of Indonesian Muslims is the effort to overcome the problem of economic inequality, universities, and low education. Ma'arif's criticism implicitly refers to the policies and responsibilities of the leaders of the nation-state in Indonesia. A leader must have an impact on reform in education and social welfare.

Ma'arif gave examples of Islamic leaders such as Muslim scholars Ahmad Azhar Basyir and A.R Fakhrudhin when they became the central leadership of Muhammadiyah. Their leadership success in the past has sensitivity to Islamic and humanitarian insight. In general, Islamic insight can be refreshed through reading the last written works of Muslim and non-Muslim writers. So that the idea can create broad human insight through reading, observation, and adequate association.[46]

Understanding socio-culture is also an important part as the basis for moral principles to create an accommodating art of leadership. Of course, this is related to the need to pay attention to various kinds of local culture as one of the national identities that must become a tradition of diversity. Like Sukarno's idea in establishing Pancasila as the basis of the Indonesian state even though it was through a long debate between national figures. The genealogical meaning of Pancasila from Sanskrit which means five moral principles is considered suitable in representing social values and cultural culture in Indonesia. According to Sukarno, Pancasila is a contemplative reflection of Indonesia's socio-historical heritage. Sukarno succeeded in combining cultural culture with Islam contained in Pancasila.

Pancasila and the democratic system have become a social contract after Indonesian colonialism.[47] From the ideas of Indonesian leaders such as Sukarno, Ahmad Azhar Basyir, A.R Fakhrudhin, and Ahmad Syafii Maarif, they succeeded in integrating Islam and Pancasila

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[45] Mun'im Sirry dkk., *Muazin Bangsa Dari Makkah Darat: Biografi Intelektual Ahmad Syafii Maarif* (Jakarta: Serambi dan Maarif Institute, 2015).

[46] Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Independensi Muhammadiyah: Di Tengah Pergumulan Pemikiran Islam Dan Politik* (Jakarta: Cidesindo, 2000).

[47] Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam Dan Pancasila Sebagai Dasar Negara: Studi Tentang Perdebatan Dalam Konstituante* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2006).

as a cultural framework. Democratization is a social contract that was built centuries ago as a legacy of the Indonesian nation which contains the idea of humanity and Indonesianness.

C. CONCLUSION

The contestation of Islamic politics in Indonesia often triggers tensions against the democratic system of state administration. This is influenced by the political mission of the conservative Islamic movement which often triggers acts of conflict. The heat of political issues often makes the public also affected due to the textualistic normative assumptions of the exclusive Islamic ideology. The spread of Islamic populism adds to the number of symbolic violence that occurs both on social media and in society. Islamic politics promoted by HTI, FPI, and others have also penetrated the digital world (social media) to win prestigious contests in Indonesia. It is as if the phenomenon of leadership election must be measured based on militant doctrines as a representative to obtain a leader who is in accordance with Islamic law. The contestation issue seems to have forgotten the tradition of leadership at the time of the Prophet to always prioritize the sovereignty of the people rather than practical politics. During the time of the Companions, the determination of Islamic leaders was based on mutual deliberation (Islamic democracy) which should have an impact on the development of the Ummah in the future. Of course, in a democratic country like Indonesia there are many things or criteria for determining Islamic leaders. As with conventional concepts which are still based on religious norms that uphold egalitarianism for the sake of creating justice and prosperity. This idea is important to be traditionalized on objectivity in the realm of elections even though the debate often arises in political contestations in Indonesia.

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